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Introduction 
 
The doctrine of Crown act of state,1 which permits the Crown to resist claims in tort brought 
against it on the basis that the action giving rise to the allegedly tortious act constituted an ‘act of 
state’, has never enjoyed any great clarity.2 No wonder: it has been for much of its history little 
more than an extrapolation from a small number of disparate and unusual cases, some of them 
barely reasoned and most of which belong to a very different constitutional era.3 The recent 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in the joined appeals in Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence 
and Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence,4 together with the first instance decisions of Leggatt J in each 
case,5 amounts to a much-needed clarification and modernisation of a doctrine which stands as 
one of the constitution’s more uncertain and anachronistic elements. This article maps the effect 
of these recent decisions on the substance of the doctrine, arguing that not only have they 
deprived the doctrine of much of its assumed effect but that they in fact demonstrate that the 
doctrine is really no such thing. It has crumbled under scrutiny and talk of it, which obscures 
rather than illuminates the key questions about the role of the courts in relation to the Crown’s 
torts abroad, should now be abandoned.  
 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Public Law, University of Southampton. I thank Mark Telford and Marta Iljadica for their 
comments on earlier versions of the present work. My thoughts on this question were heavily influenced 
by a number of long conversations with Matt Nicholson on this and related issues, and I thank him for 
his time and insight.  
1 Alternatively, ‘British’ or ‘domestic’ act of state. The doctrine in question is labelled as such so as to 
distinguish it from the separate doctrine now known as ‘foreign act of state’. On the relation between the 
two, see most recently Serdar Mohammed v Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [375]: “The 
two principles [foreign act of state and crown act of state] are distinct and, in our view, have different 
rationales.” On foreign act of state, see the recent case of Belhaj v Straw [2014] EWCA Civ 1394 and, 
discussing it in the context of the doctrine’s development, Matthew Nicholson, ‘The Political 
Unconscious of the English Foreign Act of State and Non-Justiciability Doctrine(s)’, (2015) 64 ICLQ 743. 
One of the cases discussed in the present work – Rahmatullah v The Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 
(QB) – also raised issues of foreign act of state. Those issues were separated out and joined with Belhaj on 
appeal to the Supreme Court, with argument taking place in November 2015. 
2 Perhaps the most impressive attempt to make sense of the issue is Amanda Perreau-Saussine, ‘British 
Acts of State in English Courts’ (2008) 78 British Yearbook of International Law 176. 
3 Amongst them the following: Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167, 154 ER 450; Walker v Baird [1892] AC 
491; Poll v Lord Advocate (1899) 1 F 823, (1897) 5 SLT 167; Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262; Nissan v 
Attorney-General [1970] AC 179. 
4 [2015] EWCA Civ 843. 
5 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB); Yunus Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence 
[2014] EWHC 3846 (QB). 
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Some background 
 
Crown Act of state reflects certain background features of the historical and contemporary 
constitutional order. The first is the exclusion of the Crown’s prerogative powers from the 
jurisdiction of the courts, which in the past would review the existence and scope of the power 
in question – and so establish whether what had been done by the executive was indeed within 
the prerogative6 – but would not examine the use to which such powers were put.7 The second is 
the rule – one of the ‘legal prerogatives’ of the Crown – that “the King can do no wrong,” 
glossed by Chitty as meaning that “his Majesty, individually and personally, and in his natural 
capacity… is not amenable to any other earthly power or jurisdiction… The law supposes it 
impossible that the King himself can act unlawfully or improperly.”8 The effect of this, said 
Chitty, was that, at least since the reign of Edward I, “the Crown has been free from any action 
at the suit of its subjects.”9 The common law recognised instead in the context of certain claims 
(including those relating to individual property rights) a mode of proceeding against the Crown 
known as a ‘petition of right’ which was codified and regularised by a statute of 1860. 10 A 
petition of right was severely limited in its scope. First, permission to bring a petition of right 
was required, though in practice not refused where a prima facie case was established. Moreover, 
it was “a fatal bar to the success of a petition of right to allege a tortious act on the part of the 
Crown… for such an allegation violated the rule that the Crown could do no wrong, and that 
rule has not been abrogated either at common law or by the Petitions of Right Act, 1860.”11 
Where a petition of right was unavailable, an alternative would be to bring a personal action 
against any Crown servant who could be identified as responsible for the wrongful act: “although 
in the eyes of his courts the king can do no wrong, a wrong apparently done by the king could be 
attributed to his servants, and that those servants, however, senior, were answerable not solely to 
the king but also to the courts.” 12  The opportunity to bring an action against the Crown’s 
servants or agents in person – though the basis of some of the common law’s most celebrated 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Coke in The Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, 77 ER 1352: “the King hath no 
prerogative but that which the law of the land allows him.”  
7 See, e.g., China Navigation Company v Attorney General [1932] 2 KB 197. 
8 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown: And the Relative Duties and Rights of the 
Subject, J. Butterworth and Son (1820), 5. 
9 Chitty, note 8, 339. 
10 Petitions of Right Act 1860. 
11 ECS Wade, ‘Liability in Tort of the Central Government of the United Kingdom’, (1954) 29 New York 
University Law Review 1416, 1418. The case usually taken as laying down that rule is Viscount Canterbury v 
Attorney-General (1842) 1 Ph 306, though Amanda Perreau-Saussine says that the justification offered by 
the judge in the case, Lord Lyndhurst LC, for the relevant conclusion is “dubious because so confused.” 
Perreau-Saussine, note 2, 230. See also Tobin v R (1864) 16 CBNS 310 and Feather v R (1865) 6 B&S 257. 
12 Perreau-Saussine, note 2, 229.  
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decisions protecting individual liberty13 – was subject to the possibility that the Crown would 
ratify or adopt the action of its servants (if it had not authorised it in advance), leaving only the 
(empty) possibility of an action against the Crown itself or some extra-judicial remedy.14 Both the 
non-reviewability of the prerogative generally and the specific immunity of the Crown in its own 
courts must be borne in mind when considering the nature and historical operation and 
development of the doctrine of Crown act of state. Both, however, have been significantly 
eroded – the former, as we shall see, by a series of decisions of the English courts over the last 
30 or so years; the latter by the enactment of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. 15  These 
developments call into question the traditional understanding of Crown act of state. 
 
A third contextual factor is choice of laws. Previously, a tort committed abroad could be the 
basis of a claim in the English courts only if the conduct giving rise to it was recognised as a tort 
by both English law and the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurred – this was the ‘double 
actionability’ rule.16 Since the enactment of the Private Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, 
however, the general rule is that for the purposes of tort, “the applicable law is the law of the 
country in which the events constituting the tort or delict in question occur.”17 Given that the 
doctrine of Crown act of state does not apply to actions carried out in Britain (with the possible 
but now perhaps unlikely exception of those perpetrated upon hostile aliens),18 the effect will 
normally be that the law governing situations in which the doctrine is invoked will be foreign 
law, the content of which must be proved as a question of fact. The applicability of foreign law 
to the relevant facts does not, though, preclude the pleading of Crown act of state: the doctrine 
is a rule of procedure and so “its availability is governed by English law as the law of the 
forum.”19 This presumes that England is in fact the forum in which the relevant claims are 
                                                          
13 Most obviously, Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Trials 1029. This possibility was often exploited by 
the Crown in order to undercut its own immunity: it would nominate a servant against whom an action in 
tort might be brought and indemnify that person for damages and costs. For the deprecation and then 
rejection of this practice by the courts, see Adams v Naylor [1946] AC 543 and Royston v Cavey [1947] 
KB 204. 
14 Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167. 
15 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s.2. On that Act see, generally, Glanville Williams, Crown Proceedings, 
Stevens and Sons (1948). For an account of the debates leading to its enactment, see Joseph M Jacob, 
‘The Debates behind an Act: Crown Proceedings Reform 1920-1947’ [1992] Public Law 452. 
16 On which see Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 and Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356. The rule was abolished 
by s.10 of the Private Law (Miscellaneous Provision) Act 1995. 
17 Private Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s.11(1). An exception exists where it is “substantially 
more appropriate” for the applicable law to be that of another country, in which case the law of that 
country is preferred: Private Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s.12. 
18 Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262.  
19  Yunus Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB) [218] (footnote). See: Private law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 s.14(3)(b): “[N]othing in this part… affects any rules of evidence, 
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brought. It usually will be, not least because the relevant claims are being brought against a 
Minister of the Crown. A successful plea of Crown act of state, in either of the two forms which 
the doctrine takes, will not prevent the claim thereby repelled from being brought in another 
jurisdiction: it is likely, however, that such a course of action is, for any number of reasons, 
substantially less attractive than is proceeding in an English court. 
 
The dualism of Crown act of state 
 
Though, considered holistically,  the doctrine of Crown act of state is much diminished by them, 
a key feature of the most recent round of judgments is the reaffirmation, in the face of direct 
challenge, of the doctrine’s dualism: the existence within it of two separate rules, one which 
identifies certain matters as non-justiciable and so prevents their consideration by English courts 
altogether, and another which provides a defence to a claim in tort arising out of conduct which 
the courts would otherwise be willing and able to consider. The origin of that dualism is Buron v 
Denman.20 The defendant (a naval commander) was tasked by the governor of Sierra Leone with 
freeing two British captives detained as slaves on the Gallinas islands, at the mouth of the 
eponymous river.21 In doing so Denman took possession of and then destroyed barraccoons 
(slave huts) belonging to Buron, a Spanish slave trader, and took Buron’s slaves back to Sierra 
Leone to be liberated. All this was the subject of vast praise from Ministers and naval figures. 
When Buron sued in trespass, the central question was whether Denman’s conduct could be 
“justified as an act of state, done by authority of the Crown.”22 That is, was the subsequent 
ratification of the act, in terms of approving letters sent by various Secretaries of State and the 
Lord of the Admiralty upon becoming aware of it, equivalent to prior authority? Though the 
judge whose summing up is reported, Parke B, was less sure on this point than his brethren, the 
majority in the Exchequer Court held in the affirmative, leaving Buron with a remedy only 
against the Crown via a petition of right23 or, in the alternative, the possibility of seeking some 
diplomatic remedy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pleading or practice or authorises questions of procedure in any proceedings to be determined otherwise 
than in accordance with the law of the forum.” 
20 Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167, 154 ER 450 
21 For a much fuller account of the background to the case see Charles Mitchell and Leslie Turano, Buron 
v Denman (1848) in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort, Hart 
Publishing (2010). 
22 (1848) 2 Exch 167, 188. 
23 Though Amanda Perreau-Saussine has neatly demonstrated the uncertainties in the application of the 
procedure to Buron’s case: Perreau-Saussine, note 2, 229-232. 
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The context of the decision in Buron was such that no enquiry into the concept of act of state, or 
its significance, was undertaken: what mattered was that Denman’s potential individual liability 
was extinguished by the subsequent ratification. Seemingly the sole act of state case cited in 
argument was Elphinstone v Bedreechund,24 in which it had been held that a municipal court had no 
jurisdiction over the seizure of property carried out, in contravention of the articles of 
capitulation, against the governor of a conquered fortress: the character of the seizure was “that 
of hostile seizure… regard being had both to the time, the place, and the person, and 
consequently that the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to adjudge upon the subject”.25 A 
series of nineteenth century cases before and after Buron concurred: certain questions were not 
suitable for consideration in the domestic courts.26 But, insofar as can be inferred from the brief 
discussion of the point, it seems that the doctrine of act of state does not operate in Buron as it 
did in Elphinstone.27 Instead, act of state appears to function as a defence to a claim in tort over 
which the courts enjoy rather than abjure jurisdiction: hence Park B’s reference to Denman’s 
actions being “justified as an act of state”.28 And certainly, that is how Buron has come to be 
treated, notwithstanding the thinness of the textual basis of that conclusion. To the older act of 
state rule of non-justiciability it was taken to have added a second rule: the doctrine had assumed 
a dualist nature. 
 
This dualism was observed by Emelyn Wade. 29 In a seminal contribution he noted that the 
phrase ‘act of state’ was most closely associated with the defence available to Crown servants for 
criminal30 or tortious actions in certain circumstances (not, famously, against British subjects for 
acts done in Britain) 31 – a rule evidenced by Buron v Denman and various cases decided since. 
                                                          
24 (1830) 1 Kn 316, 12 ER 340. 
25 (1830) 1 Kn 316, 360-1. 
26  See, e.g., Cook v Sprigg [1899] A.C. 572, 578: “It is a well-established principle of law that the 
transactions of independent States between each other are governed by other laws than those which 
municipal courts administer”. 
27 Though see Feather v R (1865) 6 B&S 257, 296, where Cockburn CJ takes Buron to show that “where an 
act injurious to a foreigner, and which might otherwise afford a ground of action, is done by a British 
subject, and the act is adopted by the government of this country, it becomes the act of the state, and the 
private right of action becomes merged in the international question which arises between our own 
government and that of the foreigner.” 
28 (1848) 2 Exch 167, 187 (emphasis added). 
29 ECS Wade, ‘Act of State in English Law: Its Relations with International Law’ (1934) 15 British Yearbook 
of International Law 98. An older discussion of the doctrine is found in William Harrison Moore, Act of State 
in English Law, John Murray (1906). 
30 On the application of the act of state doctrine to criminal acts, see James Fitzjames Stephen, A History 
of the Criminal Law of England, Macmillan & Co (1883), vol II, 63-4. Given the reconceptualisation of the 
tort defence rule which has taken place in recent years (discussed below), its ability to provide a defence 
to criminal acts must be strongly doubted.  
31 A proposition for which Wade cites Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029. 
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However, “the narrow application of the term as a defence to what would otherwise be a 
tortious or criminal act does not explain its full scope”32: it denoted also a category of acts not 
justiciable in domestic (‘municipal’) courts. Thus, notwithstanding that the Buron rule arose 
subsequently to the justiciability rule, it had by the 1930s managed to achieve priority over it. 
Reasoning inductively from cases of both type, Wade defined an act of state as “an act of the 
Executive as a matter of policy performed in the course of its relations with another state, 
including its relations with the subjects of that state, unless they are temporarily within the 
allegiance of the Crown.”33 When Wade’s distinction was taken up and filled out by Lord Mcnair, 
the defence again took priority,34 being stated to exist alongside “a rule which is wider and more 
fundamental, namely, that ‘those acts of the Crown which are done under the prerogative in the 
sphere of foreign affairs’… cannot form the basis of an action brought against the Crown, or its 
agents or servants, by any person, British or alien, or by any foreign state, in British municipal 
tribunals.”35 Note that the phrasing limits the non-justiciability rule in two ways: it applies to the 
situations involving (a) the exercise of the prerogative and even then only (b) in the realm of 
foreign affairs. Where Wade had identified all of the standard act of state cases as exemplifying 
the tort defence, however, Mcnair placed in that category only Buron v Denman and Johnstone v 
Pedlar (in which the doctrine did not apply because the claimant was a friendly alien): Walker v 
Baird he conceptualised as an instantiation of the non-justiciability rule. Though Mcnair admitted 
that the scope of both limbs was obscure, as was the relation between them, he took as evidence 
of their distinctiveness the fact that the tort defence, unlike the non-justiciability rule, “is not 
valid against a British subject.”36 The doctrine’s dualism was accepted by the House of Lords in 
Nissan v Attorney-General,37 but only in obiter: the doctrine was of no application there because the 
act in question – the taking of the plaintiff’s hotel as headquarters for the British command in 
Cyprus – was not itself an act of state.38 Not only, therefore, is Buron a weak authority for the 
existence of the tort defence: it was for a long time the only such authority. The doctrine’s 
dualism has always rested upon on fragile foundations.  
 
                                                          
32 Wade, note 29, 99. 
33 Wade, note 29, 103. 
34 Lord Mcnair, International Law Opinions, Cambridge University Press (1956), vol I, 111. 
35 Mcnair, note 34, 112. The quoted phrase is from Wade and Phillips, Constitutional Law, 4th edition 
(1950), 193. 
36 Mcnair, note 34, 116, footnote 1. 
37 Nissan v Attorney-General [1970] AC 179, 220B-C (Lord Morris) and 231D (Lord Wilberforce) 
38 [1970] AC 179, 215G (Lord Morris), 227B (Lord Pearce), 235H (Lord Wilberforce) and 240C-D (Lord 
Pearson). 
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Before the Court of Appeal in the joined appeals, the dualism of Crown act of state was directly 
challenged, as it had been also in the High Court in Rahmatullah. The situation of Mr 
Rahmattullah, originally captured by British forces in Iraq and handed over to American forces 
who detained him in Afghanistan, has been the subject of significant attention by the English 
courts.39 He was released from detention in Afghanistan and returned to Pakistan, his homeland, 
in June 2014. Crown act of state becomes relevant in the context of private law and Human 
Rights Act claims brought by him against the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office. For 
reasons that will be explained shortly, Rahmatullah sought to argue that there are not – as had 
been said by Wade and Mcnair and accepted in Nissan v Attorney-General – two limbs to the 
Crown act of state doctrine but only one; that “the Crown act of state doctrine is solely a rule of 
justiciability and there is no separate rule which can provide a defence to a claim in tort.”40 This 
involved reconceptualising Buron v Denman, the case taken to evidence the existence of the tort 
defence, as “merely an expression of the non-justiciability rule in a case where the defendant was 
an agent of the Crown, rather than the Crown itself.”41 It was argued that the significance of the 
post hoc ratification of Denman’s acts was that they were thereby rendered sovereign acts 
“operating at the international level of the state’s relations with a foreign state and its subjects 
and hence as inherently non-justiciable.”42 If that was the case then the alleged tort defence was 
simply a misunderstood instantiation of the non-justiciability rule rather than something separate 
from it. If the non-justiciability rule did not apply, then nor could – on this reading – the tort 
defence.  
 
This monist reading of the doctrine is attractive: its acceptance would bring clarity and coherence 
to a particularly unclear area of law and, more importantly, involve abandoning the claim, to 
which the reading of Buron which has prevailed throughout the twentieth century amounts, that 
the Crown’s say-so is sufficient to give rise to a defence in law to wrongful conduct upon which 
the courts are otherwise capable of adjudicating. What would seem to be the countervailing cost 
of the manoeuvre – the exclusion from the courts’ jurisdiction altogether of the matters giving 
rise to the alleged tort – is not as great as it initially seems, given the inroads, discussed below, 
which both the High Court and the Court of Appeal accept as having been made into the non-
                                                          
39 For the story of Rahmatullah’s habeus corpus writ, see Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2011] EWCA Civ 1540, Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs (No. 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 182, and Rahmatullah v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
(No. 2) [2012] UKSC 48. 
40 Rahmatullah v The Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [201]. 
41 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [202]. 
42 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [204]. For the equivalent submission in the Court of Appeal, see [2015] 
EWCA Civ 843, [332]-[335]. 
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justiciability rule. Crucially, this submission as to the doctrine’s monism reflects both the general 
context and the specific terms of the decision in Buron better than does most of the literature 
which accepts the existence of a separate tort defence, not asking that case to bear a burden 
which the very thin treatment of the matter therein cannot sustain. Given that the defence in tort 
which Buron is often taken as evidencing had never since been successfully plead in the English 
courts, to declare untenable the dominant reading of the case, and the doctrinal dualism to which 
it gives rise, would not have involved contradicting an established body of law. 
 
Nevertheless, the monist reading of the Crown act of state doctrine was rejected both in the 
High Court and again in the Court of Appeal. Both courts emphasised that the existence of the 
act of state tort defence and thus the dualism of the Crown act of state doctrine had been widely 
accepted, in Nissan and elsewhere.43 This is unfortunate – in Nissan, the act of state rule at issue 
was the non-justiciability rule, rather than the tort defence, and that submission failed. But on the 
wider point, the judges are correct: the literature clearly shows that in the time since it was 
decided Buron has had thrust upon it, consistently if not unanimously, a meaning which it does 
not easily bear but which the courts – or at least the lower courts – are rightly hesitant to 
overturn altogether.44 In rejecting the rewriting of Buron offered here, Leggatt J further observed 
that act of state as a defence to a tort claim is “sound in principle and rests on a proper 
appreciation of the separation of powers.”45 That claim played no role in the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal, which instead emphasised – without explanation or elaboration – that the 
doctrine must have two elements because the two rules “are applicable in different 
circumstances,” a reference (presumably) to the fact that the non-justiciability rule, unlike the 
tort defence, applies also to public law claims:46 the distinction which Mcnair identified – that the 
non-justiciability rule alone applies to British citizens – seems now improbable.47 The logic of 
this point is dubious: the two rules can have differential applicability only if they first exist, and 
                                                          
43 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [208] 
44 See also Nissan, 220: “Though the conception of an act of state as illustrated in Buron v Denman has 
been so recognised that it cannot now be overthrown I would hope that occasions for dependence on it 
as a defence will become increasingly rare.” 
45 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [208] 
46 Leggatt J In Serdar Mohammed suggests that though Crown act of state does not “operate in the field of 
public law to bar a claim for judicial review” its non-justiciability limb is “similar if not identical to the 
rule that acts of the Crown which are done under the prerogative in the sphere of foreign affairs are 
unreviewable” [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [379]. For the reasons given below, this seems to be false: the 
non-justiciability limb of Crown act of state in effect does apply to public law claims, being simply an 
instantiation of the same general rule of justiciability as governs (some) uses of that prerogative. As the 
Court of Appeal notes: “whether issues are justiciable cannot depend on the nature of the proceedings” 
[2015] EWCA Civ 843, [324]. 
47 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [397]. 
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so their differential applicability is not a factor which can be adduced in favour of their existence. 
Nevertheless, in light of the way in which the Court of Appeal’s judgement (re)frames – and, in 
effect, significantly narrows – the act of state tort defence, principle does not count against the 
rule’s continued existence as strongly as might otherwise have been the case. For now, it suffices 
to note that the opportunity of bringing coherence to the doctrine by holding it to consist of a 
single rule has twice been rejected, in large part upon the basis of the untested assumptions of a 
series of textbook writers. The Supreme Court, when it considers these issues, would be advised 
to offer a fuller elaboration of the point, whether or not it endorses the Court of Appeal’s 
narrowing of the tort defence. In the meantime, the doctrine of Crown act of state retains its 
superficial dualism even as its two limbs are progressively eroded and its coherence as a doctrine 
is undermined. 
 
The non-justiciability rule 
 
The non-justiciability limb of Crown act of state had, before the doctrine’s dualism was 
reaffirmed in Rahmatullah, been significantly undercut by the decision of the High Court in Serdar 
Mohammed – the case with which it was later joined on appeal. The claimant had been captured 
by British forces in Afghanistan and later transferred into the custody of the Afghan authorities. 
He claimed that his detention by the British forces was unlawful under both Afghan law and the 
Human Rights Act 1998. Leggatt J accepted that the detention was unlawful from the point of 
view of both Afghan and international law. In determining the application of the non-
justiciability rule, he first considered the rule’s rationale, adopting both Elias LJ’s claim in Al-
Jedda (No. 2) that this is a question about the relationship between executive government and the 
courts (“To what extent and in what circumstances should the court refuse to hold the executive 
to account in its dealings with foreign states or its handling of foreign relations”)48 and the idea 
that the “conceptual normative basis” of the doctrine lies in the notion of the separation of 
powers.49 The general principle is that “the conduct of foreign affairs is the province of the 
executive arm of the state and that the judiciary should not involve itself in (or bring into 
jeopardy) the conduct of such affairs.”50 Note here that, unlike in Mcnair’s discussion quoted 
earlier, the concern is purely with the subject matter of the power (foreign affairs) rather than its 
source. 
 
                                                          
48 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWHC 397 (QB), [197]. 
49 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [373]. 
50 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [374]. 
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The articulation of that principle indicates clearly the impossibility of the non-justiciability rule 
working as it did in the (mostly nineteenth century) cases which evidence it. Though it would 
once have been accurate to suggest that English law excluded altogether judicial oversight of the 
executive’s exercise of the foreign affairs prerogative (as it did the prerogative as whole), such a 
general proposition is no longer sustainable in light of a series of decisions which have brought 
the prerogative, in both its primary and secondary forms, within the jurisdiction of the courts – 
decisions which, crucially, post-date the last consideration of the doctrine of Crown act of state 
by the highest court.51 Most prominent amongst these is the GCHQ case, which confirmed a 
judicial willingness, flashes of which had already been visible,52 to review not merely the existence 
of prerogative powers but their exercise;53 from there on, prerogative powers would be excluded 
from review not on the basis of their source (which no longer enjoyed blanket exclusion) but on 
the basis of their subject matter.54 Though not listed by Lord Roskill in GCHQ as one of the 
powers the exercise of which would by virtue of its subject matter remain beyond the courts’ 
reach,55 the foreign affairs prerogative was identified as such by Lord Fraser.56 The decision of 
the House of Lords in Bancoult (No 2)57 however demonstrates, suggests Leggatt J,58 that, as has 
happened in relation to other prerogative powers singled-out in GCHQ,59 the excluded status of 
the foreign affairs prerogative has itself been partially eroded. Rather than it being recognised in 
law that “certain areas of decision-making by the executive such as foreign policy are ‘no go’ 
areas for the courts”,60 the golden rule which now applies to the prerogative is that reviewability 
is a function of the extent to which a particular decision of the executive is ‘justiciable’.    
 
The relevance of these background shifts is that the broader Crown act of state rule – in which it 
operates as a rule of non-justiciability which is “similar if not identical to the rule that acts of the 
Crown which are done under the prerogative in the sphere of foreign affairs are unreviewable”61 
– has been diminished. Therefore, as the non-reviewability of the prerogative in general, and that 
relating to foreign affairs in particular, has been chipped away at, so too has the possibility of a 
                                                          
51 Which took place in Nissan v Attorney General [1970] AC 179. 
52 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864. 
53 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
54 [1985] AC 374, 407 per Lord Scarman. 
55 [1985] AC 374, 418 naming “the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the prerogative of mercy 
the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the appointment of ministers.” 
56 [1985] AC 374, 398. 
57 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Bancoult [2008] UKHL 61. 
58 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [376]. 
59 See, e.g., R v Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, indicating that the management of the 
armed forces includes a large reviewable element. 
60 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [376]. 
61 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [379]. 
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successful invocation of the non-justiciability element of Crown act of state. Two points can be 
made about Leggatt J’s treatment of the issue: first of all, though commendable from the point 
of view of principle, it is in large part the result of changing attitudes as to the appropriate 
relationship of courts and executive which are too well embedded to have been challenged here, 
rather than any initiative of the judge’s own. Second, the question of how the tortious conduct is 
framed – whether it can be conceptualised as a particular decision which is itself justiciable in an 
English court, rather than as an aspect of a decision which directly reflects high policy – becomes 
vital to the question of whether the non-justiciability element of Crown act of state can be 
successfully pleaded. Here it is accepted that the decision which challenged was not one of high 
policy; it is not something which is “not cognisable by the court” as Lord Pearson put it in 
Nissan.62 Instead, the relevant decision was that to detain a particular individual and, Leggatt J 
notes, rather than being the sort of decision for which the courts are ill-equipped, the legality of 
detention is “quintessentially a matter for the court.”63 As such, he concluded on this point, 
“insofar as the Crown act of state doctrine rests on a principle of justiciability, the doctrine has 
no application in the present case.”64 Having been in this way brought up to date in Serdar 
Mohammed, the non-justiciability element of the doctrine was at first instance held to be similarly 
incapable of repelling the claims brought by Rahmatullah.65  
 
Much of the admirable clarity of Leggatt J’s judgement on this point is missing from the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning in arriving at the same conclusion as did he. That court says nothing of the 
prerogative and instead incorporates an inconclusive discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of non-justiciability in Shergill v Khaira – a consideration which implicitly 
distinguishes the act of state doctrine from non-justiciability proper but which seems to identify 
that doctrine with the tort defence limb66 – and elements of the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Al-Jedda (No 2), discussed further below. The overall effect of these considerations seems to 
be to leave the non-justiciability rule where it had been left by Leggatt J, in that it prevents the 
consideration by the courts of ‘high level policy’ decisions, in relation to which there may be no 
judicial standards available for application by the courts, or where it would be constitutionally 
                                                          
62 Nissan v Attorney-General [1970] AC 179, 327. 
63 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [381]. 
64 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [383]. 
65 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [200]. 
66 The Supreme Court refers to the doctrine “confer[ing] immunity from liability on certain persons in 
respect of certain acts.” [2014] UKSC 33, [41]. Moreover, the Court of Appeal in Serdar 
Mohammed/Rahmatullah observes also that it is unclear whether the doctrine referred to by the Supreme 
Court is that of foreign of Crown act of state [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [320]. The better reading is that it is 
the latter. 
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inappropriate for the courts to enquire into the matter: 67  the manner in which these 
considerations interact is, however, not explored. More significant is the apparent shift in the 
basis of the non-justiciability rule from the rules as to the reviewability of the prerogative on one 
hand to that of the general issue of justiciability on the other. This shift leaves ambiguous the 
question of what sort of non-justiciability is at issue in Crown act of state. The point can be 
made with reference to the two categories of non-justiciability identified by the Supreme Court 
in Shergill v Khaira and reiterated by the Court of Appeal here. The first such category includes 
circumstances in which “the issue in question is beyond the constitutional competence assigned 
to the courts under our conception of the separation of powers” such as in relation to the 
transactions of foreign states and proceedings in Parliament. 68  In this category, “once the 
forbidden area is identified, the court may not adjudicate on the matters within it, even if it is 
necessary to do so in order to decide some other issue which is itself unquestionably 
justiciable.”69 By contrast, in the second category, “comprising claims or defences which are 
based neither on private legal rights or obligations, nor on reviewable matters of public law,” this 
inability to look past the non-justiciability of the matter does not apply: instead the courts will 
adjudicate upon the matter if “a justiciable legitimate expectation or a Convention right depends 
on it” as it will also in the case of private law liabilities.70 A key example, the Supreme Court said 
in Shergill, is that in which “the court declines to adjudicate on the international acts of foreign 
state or to review the exercise of the Crown’s prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs”.71  
 
Though the Supreme Court in Shergill had, as noted above, implicitly distinguished the Crown act 
of state doctrine from non-justiciability proper, it would seem to logically follow that one or 
other of these positions must be the case for that doctrine to the extent it is based upon a non-
justiciability rule. The references by the Supreme Court, in relation to that second category, to 
the prerogative, the rule against the reviewability of which has often been identified (as by 
Leggatt J in Serdar Mohammmed) with the non-justiciability limb of Crown act of state rule, gives 
some weak basis for thinking that the Crown act of state non-justiciability rule works as does the 
second category of general non-justiciability identified in Shergill. Nevertheless, the better view 
must (unfortunately) be that the non-justiciability element of Crown act of state, where it 
operates, does so in the same manner as in the first category of non-justiciability in Shergill. Most 
clear, and probably dispositive of the question, is that where it comes to discuss the compatibility 
                                                          
67
 [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [323]. 
68 Shergill v Khaira [2014] UKSC 33, [42]. 
69 [2014] UKSC 33, [42]. 
70 [2014] UKSC 33, [43]. 
71 [2014] UKSC 33, [43]. 
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of the act of state doctrine with Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights, the Court of 
Appeal makes specific reference to the first category of non-justiciability, noting that it is “not 
concerned in this case with the second category of non-justiciability identified by the Supreme 
Court… as the claimants seek to invoke private law rights.”72 This conclusion is buttressed by 
the Supreme Court’s references in Shergill to transactions of foreign states (the original subject of 
the act of state doctrine) and to the separation of powers, which Leggatt J had identified as the 
basis of the non-justiciability rule in Serdar Mohammed.73 Finally, this conclusion would seem to 
follow from a consideration of the basic logic of the situation: if the non-justiciability rule is 
equivalent to the Supreme Court’s second category of non-justiciability in Shergill, then that limb 
of Crown act of state has been hollowed out even further than Leggatt J suggested has been the 
case, to the point that it is not clear that it could ever actually prevent the courts from hearing a 
case, no matter how grand the questions of foreign (or other) policy upon which it would require 
the court to adjudicate. The effect of assimilating the non-justiciability rule of Crown act of state 
to this first category of general non-justiciability is that the court cannot enter a ‘forbidden area’ 
even if to do so is necessary in order to decide private law rights, a conclusion which gives 
further reason for believing that the act giving rise to the tort should be framed as narrowly as is 
plausible, so as to keep it – if at all possible – outside the realm of non-justiciability. When the 
matter is considered by the Supreme Court it would do well to consider splitting the difference, 
by distinguishing the different factors identified by the Court of Appeal as rendering a matter 
non-justiciable – briefly, the need to consider questions of high-policy, the absence of judicial 
standards, and questions of constitutional appropriateness – and assimilating only the third of 
these to the first category of non-justiciability identified in Shergill. In relation to the first factor in 
particular, there is no reason to believe that it alone justifies the courts refusing to consider a 
matter which it is necessary for them to do so in order to determine an individual’s legal rights. It 
should be, therefore, brought within the second category of Shergill non-justiciability. If this sort 
of differentiation in turn encourages to the courts to clarify what are the various bases of non-
justiciability and the manner in which they interact, then so much the better. 
 
This apparent shift in the identified of the non-justiciability limb of Crown act of state raises 
further questions about Crown act of state, justiciability and the prerogative. First, does the shift 
indicate that the non-justiciability limb of the Crown act of state doctrine is not limited to 
circumstances in which the act giving rise to the tort claim is carried out under the prerogative 
                                                          
72 [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [371] 
73 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [373]. 
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powers (and has therefore been increased in scope)? This point is subtle. The reason for which 
the two matters have often been conflated is that, to the extent that non-justiciability arises in the 
context of foreign affairs, it applies to powers which in the modern constitution are found 
entirely within the prerogative. Nevertheless, the approach which the courts have taken to 
reviewability in the prerogative case law is, as discussed, now unambiguous: reviewability is a 
function of the subject matter of a power rather than its legal source. There is therefore, it seems, 
no longer any basis for distinguishing between the question of justiciability as regards the 
prerogative and as regards other sources of legal authority. In turn, this suggests that though the 
Crown act of state non-justiciability rule has often been thought of as an instantiation of the 
prerogative’s non-reviewability, it might apply equally beyond the prerogative. In fact, the best 
understanding may be that the prerogative was never truly non-justiciable per se, but instead that 
the subject matter of all or most of the prerogative powers was non-justiciable, rendering the 
prerogative non-justiciable only indirectly and contingently – what has changed over time has not 
been the courts’ approach to the review of the prerogative, but the range of subject matters of 
which they regard themselves as unable to take cognisance. If the significance of this 
reconceptualisation by the Court of Appeal is only potential rather than actual, it is because there 
are no powers to conduct foreign affairs which exist in statute rather than the prerogative – 
nothing, that is, on which the now rethought (and so implicitly widened) rule can be brought to 
bear. Following from this, a second question: if this limb of the doctrine is nothing more than an 
instantiation of the general approach taken by the courts to the question of justiciability, what 
reason is there for separating it out and packing it as an aspect of a separate doctrine? The 
answer seems to be that there is none. To the extent that is a rule of justiciability, the doctrine of 
Crown act of state adds nothing to, but in fact merely reflects, general principles of (non-
)justiciability and the understanding of the appropriate constitutional separation of power which 
underpins them. These principles may ‘bite’ more frequently on ‘acts of state’ as Wade 
understood them, but they will not do so inevitably or exclusively and any such act will include 
under its umbrella an infinite number of lesser acts which are unambiguously justiciable. The 
Court of Appeal has therefore reaffirmed here the doctrine’s dualism by confirming the existence 
of the doctrine’s tort defence limb, only to simultaneously offer an understanding of the non-
justiciability limb which calls that dualism back into question by showing that this this first limb 
is not a rule of law special to the Crown.  
 
To return to the cases at hand, the detention of Serdar Mohammed was accepted by the Court of 
Appeal, as it had been by the High Court, to be suitably distant from any decision of high policy 
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as to be well within the scope of the courts’ jurisdiction, similar issues having been already 
considered in the context of judicial review claims. 74  Because the adjudication of Serdar 
Mohammed’s claims could take place without entry into any ‘forbidden area’, the non-
justiciability rule was no bar to it. But despite it having accepted Leggatt J’s hollowing-out of the 
non-justiciability rule, the Court of Appeal noted the possibility that, contrary to what had been 
said at first instance, the claims of Rahmatullah75 might be caught even by the now-eroded rule. 
To explain why requires an understanding of Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence,76 a previous 
case arising out of the military action in Iraq and Afghanistan in which Crown act of state was 
pleaded. The claimant had been arrested in Iraq in 2004 and detained by UK forces in a military 
detention centre. After his release, he sought damages for unlawful imprisonment. When Al-
Jedda’s tort claim arrived in the Court of Appeal, the majority took the view that his detention 
was lawful under Iraqi law and so his appeal, from the decision of Underhill J, was dismissed 
without any binding decision about Crown act of state having been made. Nevertheless, two of 
the members of the Court of Appeal – Arden LJ, who dissented on the lawfulness of the 
detention under Iraqi law and whose views on Crown act of state were therefore dispositive of 
the issue for her, and Elias LJ – expressed the view that, as had been suggested by the judge at 
first instance, the doctrine of act of state in its non-justiciability form was applicable here, 
preventing the courts from enquiring into the legality of the detention. This view was, however, a 
function of the earlier House of Lords decision in Al-Jedda (No. 1) 77  that detention for the 
purpose of the internal security of Iraq was rendered obligatory by UN Security Council 
Resolutions which, though couched in the language of authorisation and not obligation, bound 
the UK to detain individuals where it was necessary for the internal security of Iraq. It was this 
obligation which transformed the specific act of detention from a probably justiciable decision 
into one over which the doctrine of Crown act of state would have displaced the courts’ 
jurisdiction.78 It is this same logic – not strictly part of the ratio of Al-Jedda (No. 2) – which the 
Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed/Rahmatullah suggested might have been capable of 
distinguishing Rahmatullah’s detention from that of Serdar Mohammed, such that the non-
justiciability rule would exclude the consideration of the former and not the latter.  
 
Viewed in light of later decisions, this account of the doctrine of Crown act of state to the facts 
of Al-Jedda is problematic. Why does the erosion of the general rules of non-justiciability which 
                                                          
74 R (Maya Evans) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWHC 1445 (Admin). 
75 Along with the so-called ‘Iraqi Civilian claimants’ 
76 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2) [2010] EWCA Civ 758 
77 [2007] UKHL 58. 
78 [2010] EWCA Civ 758, [108]-[110] and [195]. 
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was accepted in Serdar Mohammed both at first instance and on appeal not similarly place the 
specific decision to detain Al-Jedda firmly back within the courts’ purview, given the distance 
between the decision to take military action and the decision to detain the particular individual? 
As noted by Leggatt J in Rahmatullah, “[i]t was not necessary to challenge the decision to send 
British forces to Iraq in order to judge whether the detention of Mr Al-Jedda was lawful under 
Iraqi law.”79 But even the principle of the issue were – contrary to the view taken by Leggatt J in 
Serdar Mohammed and in Rahmatullah and endorsed on appeal80 – unimpeachable, the conclusion is 
built upon a shaky foundation. The House of Lord’s decision in Al-Jedda (No.1) that the 
claimant’s detention was not merely authorised but required by the UNSCRs, and his rights 
under Article 5 ECHR were therefore ousted (by virtue of UN Charter’s subordination of all 
other international legal obligations to the writ of the UN),81 was called into question by the 
decision of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. It was there held that, contrary to the 
House of Lords’ assessment, “neither Resolution 1546 nor any other United Nations Security 
Council Resolution explicitly or implicitly required the United Kingdom to place an individual 
whom its authorities considered to constitute a risk to the security of Iraq into indefinite 
detention without charge.”82 If accepted by the domestic courts, this assessment would break the 
link, upon which the relevant remarks in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Al-Jedda (No. 2) are 
predicated, between the indisputably non-justiciable choice to contribute British forces to the 
MNF in Iraq and the specific act of detaining Al-Jedda. Though it is the House of Lords’ 
decision which continues to bind the domestic courts, the Supreme Court has given permission 
to appeal to a case (in respect of which Leggatt J granted a leapfrog certificate) 83  which 
challenges the decision of the House of Lords on the UN point. If that claim succeeds, the 
defence of act of state as the majority of the Court of Appeal in Al-Jedda (No. 2) would have 
applied it will be unavailable in relation to the detention of individuals in Iraq, the decision to 
detain not being attributable to an overriding obligation arising from the UN Charter. Leggatt J 
therefore suggested in Rahmatullah that, insofar as it is necessary to explain it, Al-Jedda should be 
explained (contrary to the terms in which it was in fact decided) “on the basis of the narrower 
Crown act of state defence rather than by invoking the rule of justiciability”.84 This conclusion 
was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in in the joined cases: the “observations in Al-Jedda on the 
                                                          
79 Yunus Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [194]. 
80
 [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [323]. 
81  United Nations Charter, Article 103: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
82 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (27021/08) (2011) 53 EHRR 23   
83 Al-Waheed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 2714 (QB) 
84 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [197]. 
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applicability of the act of state principle cannot be justified on grounds of non-justiciability.”85 As 
such, the possible distinction floated between the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq was illusory, 
and the (eroded) non-justiciability rule failed also to exclude the consideration of the 
Rahmatullah’s claim.  
 
To conclude on the non-justiciability rule: the overall effect of this element of the recent series 
of decisions will be to deprive the rule of much of its practical effect. That is, though it is 
accepted that matters of high policy remain non-justiciable, it will not always, or even usually, be 
the case that where a tort claim is advanced, the specific action or decision allegedly giving rise to 
it will exist in a sufficiently close nexus with such matters as to be similarly excluded. Indeed, 
such a situation may in fact be highly exceptional. Instead, a litigant will be challenging the 
specific action which affects him or her as an individual, which the courts will usually and rightly 
characterise as a separate act, capable of being adjudicated upon by the courts without them 
carrying out any illegitimate foray into the conduct of foreign policy, which, they recognise, 
remains the exclusive province of the executive.86 Though there undoubtedly exists, at least in 
theory, a category of actions or decisions which are capable of giving rise to a claim in tort but 
which are in fact themselves by nature non-justiciable, that category is likely to be small, and the 
smaller it is, the less significant is the non-justiciability rule of Crown act of state. More 
fundamentally, however, the treatment of the issue in the Court of Appeal suggests that it is no 
longer sensible to consider the non-justiciability rule as an aspect of some special doctrine of 
Crown act of state and so to focus attention on what is or is not such an act. It is an instantiation 
of general principles of justiciability which are not unique in their application to the Crown, to 
the prerogative, or even to those acts traditionally designated ‘acts of state’. To conceive it as 
such makes room for a more determined focus upon those principles. 
 
The tort defence 
 
The cumulative effect of the cases which are the subject of this article has been to erode the tort 
defence rule of Crown act of state to at least the same extent as the non-justiciability rule. The 
basis of that erosion is however more direct and deliberate, being the conscious effect of the 
                                                          
85 [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [330]. 
86 This was essentially the basis upon which Nissan was resolved, with four of the five judges in the House 
of Lords taking the view that there was not a sufficiently close connection between the conclusion of the 
international agreement and the occupation of the hotel for the latter to fall within the doctrine. Lord 
Reid similarly held that a claim of act of state was not possible, though on the basis that the plaintiff was a 
British subject. 
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those cases rather than – as was mostly the case with the non-justiciability rule – merely the 
effect of bringing to bear upon it several decades of evolution elsewhere in the constitutional 
order. As noted, the separate existence of this second rule was confirmed, in the face of direct 
challenge to it, by both the High Court and Court of Appeal. Yet that rule, though so closely tied 
to the non-justiciability rule as to subsist within the same doctrine, must – if it is not to be 
considered to have been undermined in the same way, and for the same reasons, as has been that 
first rule – not only be something other than a mere instantiation of the non-justiciability rule, 
but have a separate basis from it altogether; one which survives the constitutional developments 
of GCHQ and Bancoult and so on. The basis identified by Leggatt J in Serdar Mohammed was that 
in the field of foreign relations, court and executive should speak with ‘one voice’87 – though in 
relation to the rights and liberties of the subject at home, the courts may and indeed must protect 
the individual against the executive, very different considerations apply in the field of foreign 
affairs, such that the individual has no expectation to be protected against unlawful executive 
action.88 This would not prevent the courts applying domestic public law principles to actions 
taken by agents of the UK in Afghanistan, but, he said, “[i]t is not the business of the English 
court to enforce against the UK state rights arising under Afghan law for acts done on the 
authority of the UK government abroad, where to do so would undercut the policy of the 
executive arm of the UK state in conducting foreign military operations.89 The crown act of state 
doctrine is on this view (re-)conceptualised as an exception to the general principle permitting 
foreign torts to be the basis of a claim in domestic courts where the foreign law is the applicable 
law, analogous to the rule whereby English courts will refuse to enforce a right arising under 
foreign law if to do so is contrary to public policy: “its effect is to preclude the enforcement of 
that tort claim in the courts of this country.”90 Leggatt J was at pains to emphasise how narrow is 
the rule on the basis of which the tort claim here fails: it applies “only to executive acts done 
abroad pursuant to deliberate UK foreign policy”; those “which are directly authorised or ratified 
by the UK government.”91 But the decision to detain Serdar Mohammed was such an act: the 
defence of act of state succeeded there,92 as it would have also, on the approach of the High 
                                                          
87 Three cases are cited in which reference was made to the ‘one voice’ principle: Al-Jedda v Secreatry of State 
for Defence [2009] EWHC 397 (QB), [212]; Government of the Republic of Spain v SS “Arantzazu Mendi” [1939] 
AC 256, 264; British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd [1984] 1 QB 142, 193. 
88 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [394]. 
89 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [395]. 
90 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [396]. 
91 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [397]. 
92 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [395]. 
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Court in Rahmatullah, if it could be shown that his arrest and detention was in accordance with 
the UK’s detention policy.93  
 
Because it may yet prove relevant, several points can be made as regards this conceptualisation of 
the public policy underlying the choice of laws rule. The first is that it demonstrates what we may 
have already suspected: there is no coherence whatsoever to the doctrine of Crown act of state, 
the two rules of which are wholly separate from each other and contingently combined under an 
umbrella term which can now be seen to be deeply misleading. The second is that is poorly 
grounded in the case law – in evidencing it Leggatt J relied not on anything said in the various 
Crown act of state cases but instead on the characterisation of Buron v Denman found in a 
textbook on the conflict of laws, providing an after the fact rationalisation of the rule which is 
imported from a very different sort of case.94 This is a third point: the cases cited in relation to 
the ‘one voice’ principle speak mostly to a different set of circumstances: that where the 
executive has an official opinion on a question which must be taken to be an opinion of the state 
as a whole and with which it makes no sense for the courts to disagree. The paradigmatic 
example is the question of whether a certain state exists, as was at issue in Government of the 
Republic of Spain v SS ‘Arantzazu Mendi’.95 Here, instead, insofar as there is a relevant question on 
which the executive and the courts might disagree, it is a question of law, and who but the courts 
are entitled to form an authoritative view on such a question? To take such a view and then 
discard it as a matter of policy is an unfortunate extension of the ‘one voice’ principle which 
provides an unattractive incentive for the executive to act in way which it knows – as it did here 
– to be unlawful. Fourth, the conceptualisation of the act of state offered here would seem to be 
in tension with the claim made by Leggatt J in Rahmatullah that, despite what was argued there, 
not only does the defence exist, but that it “rests on a proper appreciation of the separation of 
powers.”96 If courts choose, even in a limited field, to speak as they are mandated to do by the 
executive, then what is taking place is not an actualisation of the separation of powers ideal but 
its denial. Fifth, and finally, the explanation of the tort defence offered by Leggatt J at first 
instance is not just a merely technical clarification of the rule’s basis. Had it been accepted by the 
Court of Appeal, it would have widened the scope of the overall doctrine of Crown act of state. 
                                                          
93 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [224]. 
94 [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), [391], quoting Dicey, Morris & Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th Ed), [5-057]: 
“X, an officer of the Crown, duly authorised, destroys property o f A, a Spanish subject at a place outside 
the United Kingdom and Colonies. Spain and the United Kingdom are at peace, and X’s act is tortious by 
the law of the place where it is committed. X’s act is an act of state, and the court will not entertain an 
action by A against X.” 
95 [1939] AC 256 
96 [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB), [208] 
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We can make the point by considering the invocation of Crown act of state in Nissan v Attorney 
General, which failed because the taking of the hotel was not sufficiently closely connected to an 
‘act of state’ (the making of an agreement with Cyprus) for it to fall within the non-justiciability 
rule would. However, applied to those same facts, the tort defence would, on the approach of 
Leggatt J here, have succeeded: the taking of the hotel may not have been an act of state or 
suitably closely connected to one, but was presumably nevertheless within the category of 
“executive acts done abroad pursuant to deliberate UK foreign policy”.97 What this suggests is 
that, though the combined decisions of Leggatt J in Serdar Mohammed and Rahmatullah weakened 
the non-justiciability rule (having the desirable effect of asserting the courts’ jurisdiction over acts 
which would previously have escaped it), the range of actions in respect of which tort claims 
would be barred under it was in fact widened by them. This must be counted as both perverse 
and retrogressive.  
 
These points are, however, of less significance than they might have been as a result of the 
decision of the Court of Appeal that, though this limb of the act of state doctrine is indeed a 
procedural rule of domestic law reflecting public policy, the public policy considerations must be 
assessed on a case by case basis and, as such, the tort defence will not succeed simply because 
the conduct giving rise to the claim is “a sovereign act done abroad pursuant to deliberate 
foreign policy.”98 This conclusion is justified in part on the basis that there does not exist a 
similar bar in relation to public law claims (and nor is the defence available in relation to claims 
the Human Rights Act), and in part on the sense that the tort defence as conceptualised by 
Leggatt J was simply out of place – “no longer sustainable” – in the modern constitutional 
context.99 Drawing an intriguing comparison between the tort defence of the Crown act of state 
doctrine and the law on public interest immunity before and after Conway v Rimmer,100 the Court 
of Appeal held that, in deciding whether the defence should be available, the courts should 
consider “whether, in the particular factual circumstances of the case, there are any compelling 
considerations of public policy which would require the court to deny a claim in tort founded on 
an act of the Executive performed abroad.”101 We can, it seems, understand from this that the 
default situation will be that the tort defence does not apply even to acts done pursuant to a 
deliberate foreign policy – only where sufficient justification is given to depart from that default 
                                                          
97 Leaving aside the question of whether the fact that the claimant was British would, as Lord Reid 
suggested, have prevent the pleading of Crown act of state. 
98 [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [352]. 
99 [2015] EWCA Civ 843, [358]. 
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will the executive convince the courts to bar the tort claim in question. Moreover, it seems that 
even any compelling considerations identified in favour of barring a tort claim would require to 
be balanced against countervailing considerations in favour of rejecting the defence: it was 
accepted by the Secretary of State that claims for torture could not be repelled on this basis,102 
while the Court of Appeal took the view that the tort defence, as a reflection of public policy, is 
unlikely to be capable of successful invocation “if the conduct in issue constituted a grave breach 
of international law or human rights law.”103 Having rejected the specific public policy rationale 
identified by Leggatt J, the Court of Appeal has deprived the executive of the ability to bar 
certain claims from the courts on the basis of little more than its mere say-so. As a correlate, it 
has acquired for the courts a new decision-making authority, according to which it will determine 
whether or not the reasons offered for seeking to bar certain tort claims are suitably compelling. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal therefore neatly fits the pattern of administrative law in the 
last half-century or so, whereby the courts have slowly but surely rewritten notions of 
constitutional appropriateness, dismantled distinctions which exempted certain executive acts 
from judicial oversight, and intensified standards of review so as to obtain greater scope to 
subject to scrutiny the actions of the executive even in its most precious policy areas and to 
require, as a condition of any attempt to avoid that scrutiny, that the executive justify itself to the 
courts.  
 
More than that, however, in thus narrowing the tort defence the Court of Appeal has given 
reason to doubt the usefulness of conceptualising the rule as the aspect of an overarching 
doctrine known as Crown act of state. That is, unlike in the case of the doctrine as understood 
by Leggatt J, which stays largely true to the past understanding of the rule’s effect (if not its 
nature), the Court of Appeal has held that just because an act was done by the Crown in pursuit 
of its foreign policy does not mean a claim arising out of it will be barred. Not only is this not a 
sufficient condition, however: neither is a necessary one. The same public policy considerations 
which may bar a claim based on foreign law in relation to an ‘act of state’ may similarly bar a 
claim which does not involve any such thing: the rule, we now see, is merely a general rule of 
public policy which is a well-known feature of the choice of laws, and which is acknowledged 
within the 1995 Act by a saving provision which provides that nothing in the relevant part 
“authorises the application of the law of a country outside the forum as the applicable law for 
determining issues arising in any claim in so far as to do so… would conflict with principles of 
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public policy.”104 At first instance, Leggatt J had suggested that his own understanding of the tort 
defence was analogous with this rule. The better view, the decision of the Court of Appeal 
shows, is that it is simply a manifestation of it, one which does not apply uniquely, or even 
specially, to the Crown: it would bar a claim of the sort at issue in Buron v Denman, but would (in 
present circumstances) do so even if the defendant was a private party rather than the Crown, 
given that the enforcement of property rights in slaves would undoubtedly be contrary to public 
policy. Though the public policy considerations which apply to alleged ‘acts of state’ may be 
different, or apply with different weight, the balancing act the courts must undertake is a familiar 
one, not unique to such acts. In clarifying and narrowing the rule, these judgements have 
therefore clearly demonstrated that it no longer, if it ever did, makes sense to think of a distinct 
doctrine of Crown act of state: better to think of two rules, one of justiciability, one of the choice 
of laws, which will apply (but not exclusively) to certain acts of the Crown, either preventing the 
courts from adjudicating upon those acts, or barring tort claims arising out of them. To continue 
to treat the doctrine as something distinct and special – as reflecting a privileged legal status of 
either the Crown or certain of its acts – would be to wrongly reify it, and would obstruct a clear 
view of what should and will be the legal consequences of the acts of the Crown abroad.  
 
Where at first instance the tort defence had been held to bar the claims of both Serdar 
Mohammed and Rahmatullah, the tighter understanding of public policy – to be considered on a 
case by case rather than blanket basis – endorsed by the Court of Appeal lead to very different 
results. In the case of Mohammed, having emphasised the Secretary of State’s decision to 
authorise a detention policy “outside and contrary to the authority” granted by the UN Security 
Council Resolutions and contrary to Afghan law, as well as his failure to put proposals for 
legislation barring tort claims of this sort (as had been done in the United States), the Court held 
that it could see no “compelling considerations of public policy which should prevent reliance on 
Afghan law as the basis of the claims in tort brought in these proceedings.”105 That is, where 
Leggatt J’s understanding of public policy caused Mohammed’s claim to be barred, the new, 
stricter approach of the Court of Appeal, means that it can proceed. For Rahmatullah and the 
Iraqi civilian claimants, the result was ambiguous (though still more favourable to the claimants 
than that of the High Court) in that the question of where the balance of public policy 
considerations lay was left open for determination at trial. It is clear, however, that a key factor in 
that decision will be whether or not the United Kingdom was under an overriding obligation, 
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arising out of Security Council Resolutions, to detain or intern “for reasons of security” in 
Iraq. 106  As discussed above in the context of the Al-Jedda case, that question will soon be 
revisited by the Supreme Court. If it follows the Strasbourg Court in holding that, contrary to its 
own decision in Al-Jedda (No.1), the UK was under no such obligation, it seems likely that the 
Crown act of state defence will ultimately fail in barring the tort claims of Rahmatullah and the 
Iraqi civilians. The Al-Jedda (No.1) issue may though ultimately impede Rahmatullah’s tort claim 
via the tort defence notwithstanding that the severability of the high policy decision to go to war 
from the specific decision to detain meant that it failed to do so under the non-justiciability rule. 
 
Two further issues regarding the tort defence were raised for the first time before the High 
Court in Rahmatullah and dealt with there and on appeal. The first was the claim that, even if the 
defence of Crown act of state had previously existed, it was abolished by the Crown Proceedings 
Act 1947, s.2 (1) of which renders the Crown subject to the normal liabilities in tort in respect of 
torts committed by its ‘servants or its agents’, on the proviso that “no proceedings shall lie 
against the Crown… in respect of any act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless 
the act or omission would apart from the provisions of this Act have given rise to a cause of 
action in tort against the servant or agent or his estate.” It was noted above that the origins of 
the doctrine of Crown act of state date to an era, put to an end by the 1947 Act, in which the 
Crown could do no wrong; a rule which entailed, for present purposes, that it could not be liable 
in tort. The argument advanced here was that the defence of Crown act of state was an aspect of 
the Crown’s general immunity from tort liability and so it, like the more general immunity of the 
Crown, was extinguished by the statutory intervention. Leggatt J at first instance rejected this 
claim;107 that the Court of Appeal endorsed his rejection of it is of course of less significance 
given that it did so in the context of a diminished, rather than enhanced, tort defence.108 More 
important is the claim that the defence of Crown act of state is a procedural bar which interferes 
with a claimant’s rights under Article 6 of the ECHR – one which even if it pursues a legitimate 
aim, does so in an arbitrary and disproportionate aim. Leggatt J rested his conclusion as to the 
proportionality of the procedural bar – and therefore its compliance with Article 6 – on the 
limited scope of the doctrine, which applies only to acts “done abroad pursuant to deliberate UK 
foreign policy”, and applies only to claims arising under foreign law (and so not to HRA 
claims).109 Nothing in the doctrine prevents any claim being brought in any other jurisdiction, 
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while it remains open to the claimant to challenge the legality of the policy in pursuit of which 
the acts were committed on English public law grounds. 110  The doctrine’s alleged 
disproportionality was attributed in large part to its potential retrospective operation – i.e., that it 
can operate as a defence to tort claims arising out of actions which were ‘adopted’ subsequent to 
taking place rather than being authorised in advance, as had happened in Buron v Denman. This 
point was left open, however: the actions out of which Rahmatullah’s tort claims emerge were 
carried out pursuant to a policy established in advance and so there was no need to confirm 
whether retrospectivity renders the procedural bar a disproportionate interference with a 
claimant’s Article 6 rights.111 The Court of Appeal, by contrast, treated the two limbs of the 
doctrine separately. Though its conclusions as to the applicability of the non-justiciability rule 
rendered the question of the rule’s compatibility with Article 6 academic, the Court indicated its 
belief that in that compatibility, given that the non-justiciability rule, in reflecting “limitations on 
the role of the judicial function which are inherent in the allocation of powers under our 
constitution” clearly pursues a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.”112 In arriving at the 
same conclusion as to the compatibility of the tort defence with Article 6 as had Leggatt J, 
however, the Court of Appeal suggested that the tort defence as conceptualised at first instance 
would not be compatible: the absolute nature of the bar would – even if the ‘one voice’ principle 
were recognised as a legitimate aim – be neither a necessary or proportionate means of achieving 
it in light of the unfettered ability to bring public law and human rights claims arising out of the 
same facts.113 The tort defence was compatible was Article 6 only because it was rewritten by the 
Court of Appeal to reflect a fact-specific, case by case consideration of public policy.  
 
Finally, alongside the clear and significant narrowing of both the non-justiciability rule and the 
tort defence, one further issue must be mentioned briefly – the clarification that neither of the 
doctrine’s two rules bar claims under the Human Rights Act. This conclusion was arrived by 
Leggatt J on the straightforward basis that act of state is a feature of the common law which “has 
been overridden by Parliament when it enacted the Human Rights Act.”114 To read into that Act 
an implied exception to the basic section 6(1) rule in relation to acts of state would be 
incompatible with its purpose and create an unwelcome divergence between the enforcement of 
Convention Rights in domestic law and before the Strasbourg Court, to which the doctrine is of 
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no relevance.115 The Court of Appeal concurred:116 the narrowing of the doctrine within its 
traditional domain(s) was therefore accompanied by a refusal to permit its expansion into other 
areas of law.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The doctrine of Crown act of state is much diminished. It is now clear that the non-justiciability 
element does not apply to Human Rights Act claims, while the tort defence rule permits both 
those and public law claims. Even where each of the doctrine’s rules does bite, their scope is far 
more limited than would have been understood until recently. All of this is welcome – the very 
existence of the doctrine is in tension with the rule of law and its progressive limitation is a 
victory for that idea even if (as seems possible) it ultimately encourages Parliament to legislate in 
order to fill the gap which recent decisions have opened up. More than that, however, the 
rethinking of these rules which has been precipitated by military endeavours in Iraq and 
Afghanistan calls into question the coherence of the doctrine qua doctrine. First, because the two 
rules comprising the doctrine are so different in their basis and their application as to be 
essentially unrelated. Second, and more fundamentally, because it is now clear that neither rule is 
unique in its application to the Crown or even to those acts traditionally identified as ‘acts of 
state’. The older rule is an instantiation in the field of foreign affairs of general principles of 
justiciability and non-justiciability which themselves reflect the undeniable fact that some 
questions (which, we may debate) are unsuitable for judicial determination. The second is a rule 
of the conflict of laws reflecting general considerations of public policy which require a case by 
case examination of the relevant act within its specific legal and factual context. The doctrine has 
been exposed to the scrutiny of courts which have long since ceased to automatically defer to the 
executive in the field of foreign affairs, and it has been found wanting. It should now be 
abandoned, so as to allow the difficult questions of the separation of powers and public policy 
which lurk behind the two rules to take centre stage. 
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